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Liberal Constitutionalism and Economic 
Inequality 
Rosalind Dixon† & Julie Suk†† 
Economic inequality is rising in democracies across the world and poses a 
clear threat to both the stability and legitimacy of liberal constitutional models. Can 
liberal constitutionalism respond to this threat? Or are there inherent limits to the 
liberal model that prevent an effective response? This Essay explores these questions 
by surveying the range of possible structural and rights-based constitutional re-
sponses to economic inequality, as well as possible obstacles to these responses—
including problems of definition, leveling up versus down, unintended or counter-
productive consequences, and institutional path dependence. 
INTRODUCTION 
Equality is guaranteed in every liberal-democratic consti-
tution around the world, but inequality of wealth and income is 
widespread and on the rise. In recent years, there has been in-
creasing attention by economists and political scientists to the 
widening gap between the rich and poor, as well as the erosion 
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of the middle class.1 Legal scholars2 and politicians3 have also rec-
ognized that rising economic inequality can undermine a well-
functioning democracy. This Essay begins by identifying the 
threats posed by certain manifestations of economic inequality to 
liberal constitutionalism, and then shifts to evaluating the range 
of constitutional responses around the world to these threats. We 
focus on the enforcement of constitutional rights, such as equality 
and social rights, which has had limited success in reducing the 
problematic forms of economic inequality. We then consider struc-
tural interventions and other constitutional approaches to redis-
tribution in order to highlight the enduring challenges for liberal 
constitutional orders in reducing the forms of inequality that can 
erode liberal-democratic institutions. In exploring the range of 
constitutional responses to extreme income inequalities, we illus-
trate the uncertainty and importance of confronting these ine-
qualities for the future of liberal constitutionalism. 
This Essay is divided into three Parts. Part I identifies the 
forms of inequality in income and wealth that are on the rise 
worldwide, and explains why they threaten basic democratic com-
mitments and institutions. Part II surveys the ways in which lib-
eral constitutions have responded to this problem, with a focus on 
a broader range of structural interventions, as a matter of consti-
tutional design and legislative implementation, that could ad-
dress the growing threat of economic inequality, in contrast to the 
enforcement of equality/nondiscrimination rights and social 
rights. Part III explores and compares the obstacles and limits to 
rights-based and structural responses, and reflects on the implica-
tions of these challenges for the future of liberal constitutionalism. 
 
 1 See generally, for example, Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
(Belknap 2014); Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done (Harvard 2015); 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our 
Future (Norton 2012); Peter Temin, The Vanishing Middle Class: Prejudice and Power in 
a Dual Economy (MIT 2017); Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, The Race between 
Education and Technology (Belknap 2009); Heather Boushey, J. Bradford DeLong, and 
Marshall Steinbaum, eds, After Piketty: The Agenda for Economics and Inequality (Harvard 
2017); Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded 
Age (Princeton 2d ed 2016); Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: 
How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (Simon 
& Schuster 2010).  
 2 See, for example, Joseph Fishkin and William E. Forbath, The Anti-oligarchy 
Constitution, 94 BU L Rev 669, 670 (2014); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Crisis of the Middle-
Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our Republic 3–5 (Knopf 2017). 
 3 See, for example, Bernie Sanders, Our Revolution: A Future to Believe In 188, 206 
(Dunne 2016); Elizabeth Warren, This Fight Is Our Fight: The Battle to Save America’s 
Middle Class 22–26 (Metropolitan 2017). 
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I.  TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM 
There is a growing literature on the extremes of economic in-
equality that have become commonplace in liberal democracies 
throughout the world. First, income inequality is on the rise, with 
a widening gap between the highest- and lowest-income earn-
ers in almost every Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) country. Even in countries with a his-
tory of a more equal income distribution, such as Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden, the share of the top 1 percent has increased by 70 per-
cent, reaching around 7–8 percent by the late 2000s.4 In Germany, 
income inequality levels in the 1980s were close to those found in 
the traditionally equal Nordic countries, but there has been a 
sharp rise since 2000. In 2008, the average income of the top 10 
percent of working-age Germans is nearly eight times higher than 
that of the bottom 10 percent, up from a ratio of six to one in the 
mid-1990s.5 In France, the ratio between the top 10 percent and 
bottom 10 percent was seven to one in 2008, but levels of inequal-
ity have remained relatively stable since the 1990s, when ine-
quality declined.6 Nonetheless, as Professor Thomas Piketty and 
others have noted, France, too, has experienced some increases in 
inequality in recent years since 2008.7 In the United States, the 
top 1 percent of families made 25.3 times as much as the bottom 
99 percent in 2013.8 In the United Kingdom, the share of the top 
1 percent of income earners increased from 6.7 percent in 1981 to 
12.9 percent in 2011.9 
Second, poverty is on the rise in the developed world, coincid-
ing with the shrinking of the middle class in many of the world’s 
leading democracies. In the United States, from 2000 to 2014, the 
 
 4 Top Incomes and Taxation in OECD Countries: Was the Crisis a Game Changer? 
*2 (OECD, May 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6CNS-54BL. 
 5 Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising—Country Note: Germany (OECD, 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9XXM-SLPE. 
 6 Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising—Country Note: France (OECD, 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4ZSE-NQMU. 
 7 See Nicolas Frémeaux and Thomas Piketty, France: How Taxation Can Increase 
Inequality, in Brian Nolan, et al, Changing Inequalities and Societal Impacts in Rich 
Countries: Thirty Countries’ Experiences 248, 249–50 (Oxford 2014) (noting an “increase 
[in inequality] during the last decade of the period of observation” and that “[t]he 2008 
recession does not modify this upward trend”). 
 8 See Teresa Tritch, The United States of Inequality (NY Times, June 21, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/5W39-CENF. 
 9 Income Inequality Data Update and Policies Impacting Income Distribution: 
United Kingdom *1 (OECD, Feb 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/STW7-2RNH. 
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share of adults living in middle-income households fell in 203 of the 
229 metropolitan areas examined by the Pew Research Center, 
coupled with a decrease of 6 percentage points or more in 53 met-
ropolitan areas.10 In 2016, the OECD reported that the middle-
income group of the population had decreased on average across 
the OECD since the 1980s. For example, since 2000, the share of 
middle-income households in the United States, Germany, and 
Luxembourg has fallen by 5 percent.11 On average in the OECD, 
the middle-income group collectively had incomes six times the 
level of the collective incomes of the top income group in the 
1980s; this ratio fell to five to one in the 1990s and has fallen to 
four to one since the 2000s.12 In South Korea, the percentage of 
families that were middle class decreased from 75 percent in 1990 
to 67.1 percent in 2013.13 Studies have also shown that the dis-
tance between the market income share of the upper class and 
middle class has increased in the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Poland.14 
Both the concentration of wealth at the top and the decline of 
the middle class pose threats to liberal constitutionalism. Many 
commentators suggest that the rise of populist nationalism in 
some of the world’s leading democracies—as evidenced by the 
election of Donald Trump to the US presidency and the Brexit 
vote to leave the European Union after openly xenophobic cam-
paigns—is driven in part by the stagnation of wages and economic 
insecurity.15 At the very least, there is a correlation between lower 
levels of education and income and support for populist-nationalist 
political agendas. In the United Kingdom, voters’ support for 
leaving the European Union was highly correlated with lower lev-
els of education and, to a lesser extent, income.16 In the United 
 
 10 America’s Shrinking Middle Class: A Close Look at Changes within Metropolitan 
Areas (Pew Research Center, May 11, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2LUU-FP5Y. 
 11 The Squeezed Middle Class in OECD and Emerging Countries: Myth and Reality 
*2 (OECD, Dec 1, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/C93R-59YY. 
 12 Id at *7 (the OECD defining the “middle-income group” as between 0.75 and 2 
times the median and top income as exceeding twice the median). 
 13 Kye-wan Cho, South Korea’s Middle Class Is Shrinking, According to Recent Re-
port (The Hankyoreh, Feb 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/EFM8-TUZW. 
 14 Ursula Dallinger, The Endangered Middle Class? A Comparative Analysis of the 
Role Played by Income Redistribution, 23 J Eur Soc Pol 83, 95 (2013). 
 15 See, for example, Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the 
Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash *10–12 (HKS Faculty Re-
search Working Paper Series, Aug 2016) (on file with author) (explaining the “economic 
insecurity thesis” as one explanation for rise of populist nationalism). 
 16 See Andrew McGill, Who Voted for the Brexit? (The Atlantic, June 25, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/437T-X552.  
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States, there was also a close correlation between income levels and 
support for Trump in key states like Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, 
and Pennsylvania.17 
What Brexit and Trump have in common is not a set of poli-
cies likely to be advanced by each electoral victory, but rather a 
politics of resentment against a status quo created by incumbent 
governing elites.18 The populist resentment and rejection of the 
professional elites who lead most governing institutions begin to 
threaten liberal democracy when they include xenophobic scape-
goating and a disregard for the rule of law. Notwithstanding the 
Left’s critique of the European Union’s democratic deficit,19 the 
politics of Brexit and the rise of Trump have raised concerns 
about racism and the erosion of the liberal-democratic institutions 
necessary to a stable constitutional order. Leading scholars of com-
parative constitutional law, such as Professors Tom Ginsburg and 
Aziz Huq, have suggested that inequality of wealth and income 
are clearly correlated with a reversion from democratic to anti-
democratic rule, or are “significantly higher in democracies that 
eventually underwent a reversal.”20 
There are various accounts of the dynamics by which eco-
nomic inequality undermines liberal democracy. Some have ar-
gued that the current growing forms of economic inequality are 
inimical to economic growth.21 Others have noted that the grow-
ing divide between rich and poor effectively limits class mobility.22 
When individuals who are born poor cannot become rich, and vice 
versa, liberal constitutions’ commitment to the freedom of indi-
viduals to determine their own fates is exposed as false. When in-
dividuals’ lives are determined by parental wealth with no signifi-
cant role for individual autonomy, that society is an aristocracy; 
 
 17 Nate Cohn, Why Trump Won: Working-Class Whites (NY Times, Nov 9, 2016), 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/upshot/why-trump-won-working-class 
-whites.html (visited Sept 1, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 18 See John Cassidy, What Do the Brexit Movement and Donald Trump Have in Common? 
(New Yorker, June 23, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/XSE8-Q974; Joan C. Williams, White 
Working Class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness in America 3 (Harvard Business Review 
2017) (reporting that white working-class voters supported Trump because, in the words 
of one of them, “We’re voting with our middle finger,” in an era when the economic fortunes 
of working class voters have plummeted). 
 19 See Richard Tuck, The Left Case for Brexit (Dissent, June 6, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/96BU-CBWY. 
 20 Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, Why Democracies Fail, 19 J Democracy 
57, 61 (Oct 2008). See also Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional De-
mocracy, 65 UCLA L Rev *4 (forthcoming 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/G48G-6ZDB.  
 21 See Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality at 83 (cited in note 1).  
 22 See Bartels, Unequal Democracy at 18–22 (cited in note 1). 
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it is not the society that liberal-democratic constitutions purport 
to create. In these extreme forms, economic inequality is at odds 
with the political and legal equality on which the legitimacy of 
liberal constitutional orders depends. Political legitimacy, in a lib-
eral constitutional order, depends on there being, at a minimum, 
substantive equality of opportunity and substantively equal 
forms of political participation. High levels of inequality in wealth 
and income threaten both of these commitments.23 High levels of 
income, and especially wealth, enable some citizens to exercise 
greater control over political institutions, to hoard opportunities 
for themselves and their progeny, and to enact policies that per-
petuate and reproduce the disadvantage of the unlucky.24 When 
disparate economic power enables disparate political power, the 
situation is not only at odds with democracy; it is also resented. 
Populist resentment, even if grounded in legitimate concerns 
about injustice, can be expressed in political movements with un-
just and hateful agendas that threaten other important founda-
tions of liberal-democratic constitutions, such as commitment to 
race and gender equality. For these reasons, the survival and 
health of liberal-democratic constitutional orders require some 
attention to the current dynamics of rising economic inequality. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
Can liberal-democratic constitutional orders respond to the 
threat posed by the rise of economic inequality? In this Part, we 
survey the various ways in which liberal democracies have at-
tempted to prevent or reduce economic inequality, focusing on the 
constitutional provisions and resources that have been deployed. 
Economists suggest that, to mitigate the threat of economic ine-
quality, three broad policy responses are needed: measures that 
can foster more inclusive forms of growth, policies that can pre-
vent the overconcentration of wealth and income, and forms of 
 
 23 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 6 (Columbia 1993) (“Social and economic in-
equalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.”). 
 24 See K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy against Domination 2–3 (Oxford 2016). 
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economic redistribution that can mitigate the downsides of ongo-
ing poverty and middle-class compression.25 In most liberal democ-
racies, such policies are statutory and regulatory, and their adop-
tion or success may not have an obvious constitutional dimension. 
In many constitutional democracies, legislatures are actively 
considering, and passing, measures to increase investments in ed-
ucation and training, raise the minimum wage, guarantee a uni-
versal basic income, and invest in new industries they identify as 
providing opportunities for growth in high-paying jobs. But there 
are also many democracies in which such measures are noticeably 
absent. Solutions for addressing inequality do not make it into 
mainstream political debate, and any proposals for change are 
easily defeated by opposition parties or a minority within the gov-
erning coalition. Powerful economic elites and interest groups will 
often work to prevent significant changes that would reduce their 
privilege or redistribute their wealth. Legislatures may also be 
subject to burdens of inertia, which impede or delay measures of 
this kind; individual legislators will often disagree about the best 
way to respond to complex problems like inequality. This can also 
lead party leaders to avoid addressing particular issues, even 
when they are of clear concern to voters. 
To illustrate, most Americans support paid family or medical 
leave for workers, according to a recent poll.26 Paid family and 
medical leave is a measure that would alleviate a significant 
source of economic insecurity for families who depend on their 
salaries to live, particularly the working and middle classes.27 
 
 25 See, for example, Era Dabla-Norris, et al, Causes and Consequences of Income In-
equality: A Global Perspective *30–32 (IMF, June 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/92TX 
-ZQM6; A Family Affair: Intergenerational Social Mobility across OECD Countries, in Eco-
nomic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth *183, 195–98 (OECD, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AX6D-3CTP; Estanislao Gacitúa Marió, Michael Woolcock, and Marisa 
von Bulow, Overview: Assessing Social Exclusion and Mobility, in Estanislao Gacitúa 
Marió and Michael Woolcock, eds, Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil 1, 22–24 (World 
Bank 2008). See also Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 Cornell L Rev 
1171, 1219–26 (2016); Jonathan B. Baker and Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Pol-
icy, and Inequality, 104 Georgetown L J Online 1, 13–15 (2015) (offering and analyzing 
various antitrust policies to alleviate economic inequalities). 
 26 See Lauren Weber, Most Americans Support Paid Leave for Workers, Poll Finds 
(Wall St J, Dec 13, 2016), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/most-americans-support 
-paid-leave-for-workers-poll-finds-1481641205 (visited Dec 23, 2017) (Perma archive una-
vailable), citing Election Analysis Suggests Voters Reward Candidates Who Advocate for 
Family Friendly Workplace Policies (National Partnership for Women and Families, Dec 
6, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/4B66-STYQ. 
 27 For a broader discussion of the class effects of work-family conflict, see Joan 
C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter 42–76 
(Harvard 2010). 
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President Barack Obama called on Congress to pass paid-family-
leave legislation year after year in his State of the Union ad-
dress. Congress adopted the Family and Medical Leave Act28 in 
1993, guaranteeing unpaid leave. The Family and Medical 
Leave Insurance Act has been proposed in Congress since 2013.29 
Even President Trump, while cutting other social welfare bene-
fits, voiced his support for paid parental leave, especially maternity 
leave, throughout his electoral campaign. But to date, Congress 
has not legislated paid parental leave. Legislators disagree about 
the scope of coverage, methods of funding the benefit, and the ex-
tent to which employers should be required or incentivized to pro-
vide it. Today, a quarter century after Congress legislated unpaid 
leave, only 14 percent of American workers receive paid leave 
from their employers.30 
Constitutional enforcement can play a role in light of these 
obstacles to legislative solutions to economic inequality. The idea 
that economic inequality is a constitutional problem has been en-
gaged by constitutional courts and judges, as well as lawyers and 
legislators in many liberal constitutional democracies. We begin 
by mapping out the broad range of contexts in which economic 
inequality has been imagined as a constitutional problem, and 
evaluate the efforts to explain, overcome, or resolve it. First, we 
consider structural interventions. Next, we survey the equality 
provisions in various constitutions. Finally, we consider the adju-
dication of constitutional rights. Litigants before some constitu-
tional courts around the world have often invoked the nearly 
ubiquitous constitutional guarantee of equality to challenge cer-
tain manifestations of inequality. In several countries, unequal 
education, as measured by resources allocated or by admissions 
requirements, is a frequent subject of such constitutional claims. 
The efforts to enforce constitutional equality rights in the educa-
tion context also draw out a related set of constitutional provi-
sions that are frequently invoked to disrupt economic inequality: 
social and economic rights. Such claims are often simultaneous 
with equality-based claims, but they need not be. An increasing 
number of constitutions worldwide contain a long list of social-
rights guarantees: in addition to education rights, constitutions 
 
 28 Pub L No 103-3, 107 Stat 6 (1993), codified as amended at 29 USC § 2601 et seq. 
 29 See Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act of 2013, HR 3712, 113th Cong, 1st 
Sess, in 159 Cong Rec H 8107 (daily ed Dec 12, 2013). 
 30 See Health Policy Brief *2 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Nov 21, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/6E9Y-V3SG. 
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entitle citizens to work, health, housing, food, water, and social 
security. Even in the United States, though the federal constitu-
tion does not contain social rights, all state constitutions protect 
some subset of these rights, particularly rights to education. 
A. Structure 
Rights provisions, for reasons we shall explore below, may 
not be the most significant constitutional intervention for eco-
nomic inequality. Structural provisions are arguably para-
mount.31 Imagine, for instance, legislative quotas or reserved 
seats for individuals from different income groups, or other con-
stitutional features designed to make the legislature more di-
rectly responsive to the poor or the median wage earner.32 One 
obvious downside to high levels of economic inequality is their 
capacity to affect the political process in ways that become self- 
perpetuating: extreme levels of inequality or wealth and income 
can give certain individuals and corporations disproportionate in-
fluence over electoral politics, and thereby reduce the likelihood of 
elected officials adopting policies that favor the poor or the middle 
class. In the United States, for instance, 93 percent of all money 
contributed to super PACs comes from only 0.001 percent of 
Americans, and there is clear evidence that Congress tends to be 
consistently more responsive to the views of these wealthy donors 
than to those of either the poor or the middle class.33 
If we are to address, or even just prevent the worsening of, 
economic inequality, constitutions will therefore need to cabin the 
role of money in politics. In the United States, some politicians have 
thus called for a constitutional amendment to reverse Citizens 
United v Federal Election Commission34 and allow the regulation 
of super PACs, so as to reduce the disproportionate influence of 
 
 31 See Roberto Gargarella, Equality, in Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg, eds, Com-
parative Constitutional Law in Latin America 176, 183, 188–94 (Elgar 2017) (arguing that 
constitutional reforms require more than just more rights to promote equality and must 
also consider the power structures). 
 32 Elliot W. Bulmer, Constitutional Responses to the Crisis of Representation and 
Oligarchic Democracy (unpublished manuscript, 2017) (on file with authors). See also 
Fishkin and Forbath, 94 BU L Rev at 690–96 (cited in note 2) (discussing modern proposed 
legislative solutions to the problem). 
 33 See Samuel Plank, Campaign Finance after Citizens United (Harvard Political 
Review, Oct 26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/QAE9-ZUDW. See also Mimi Murray 
Digby Marziani, Money in Politics after Citizens United: Troubling Trends & Possible Solu-
tions (Brennan Center for Justice, Apr 18, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/5XVT-TABR. 
 34 558 US 310 (2010). 
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corporations and wealthy donors in politics.35 In other countries, 
such as Canada, there is also ongoing debate about how to reform 
the electoral system to promote more direct representation of 
lower income groups.36 Other structures could increase legislative 
attention to the needs of the poor. Consider, for example, legisla-
tive committees or government agencies with special responsibil-
ity for issues of poverty or income inequality.37 Many existing leg-
islative committee structures have been adapted to create a more 
sustained and direct focus by subgroups of legislators on issues of 
poverty and economic inequality. In some countries, such as 
Ghana, there have also been recent moves to create new initia-
tives in legislative committees with distinct responsibility for is-
sues of poverty.38 
Other countries have created independent state bodies re-
sponsible for addressing issues of poverty or economic vulnerabil-
ity. Indeed, it is not uncommon for constitutions to provide for the 
representation of labor unions and other representatives of vul-
nerable groups in a formal consultative capacity. Following World 
War II, the French constitution created the Economic Council as 
an institution that would support the reestablishment of social 
democracy.39 Largely consisting of representatives of organized 
labor, the Economic Council, which later became the Social and 
Economic Council, was initially charged with reviewing proposed 
legislation affecting social and economic policy. As of 2008, the 
institution is now the Economic, Social, and Environmental 
Council, and its seats are held not only by union leaders in var-
ious sectors, but also by other groups of stakeholders like em-
ployers, students’ associations and associations of young people, 
 
 35 See, for example, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economics versus Pol-
itics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice, 27 J Econ Persp 173 (Spring 2013). See also generally Adam 
Przeworski, Deliberation and Ideological Domination, in Jon Elster, ed, Deliberative De-
mocracy 140 (Cambridge 1998). See also Fishkin and Forbath, 94 BU L Rev at 694–96 
(cited in note 2). 
 36 See Brian Tanguay and Steven Bittle, Parliament as a Mirror to the Nation: Pro-
moting Diversity in Representation through Electoral Reform, Canadian Issues 61, 63 
(Summer 2005). 
 37 See Call for Papers: Constitutional Responses to the Crisis of Representation and 
Oligarchic Democracy (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance), 
archived at http://perma.cc/U3DQ-N2HJ. 
 38 See Ken Sackey and Benjamin Mensah, Ghana Has No Reliable Agricultural 
Data—Minister (Ghana News Agency, June 16, 2016), online at http://www 
.ghananewsagency.org/social/ghana-has-no-reliable-agricultural-data-minister-104875 
(visited Sept 1, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).  
 39 See Fr Const Title XI, Arts 69–71. 
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professional associations, and environmental groups.40 Models of 
this kind could also be expanded, and adapted, so as to even more 
directly focus on issues of economic equality as well as vulnerability. 
Structural changes could also focus on procedural hurdles to 
the passage of economic reform within the legislature.41 In many 
countries, there are legislative proposals to adopt more redistrib-
utive economic policies, but those initiatives have been defeated 
by various legislative and executive veto points. Removing the 
number of hurdles to successful legislative, or executive, policy 
change would thus be one logical way of promoting the enactment 
of policies of this kind. In Italy, for example, a 2016 constitutional 
amendment proposal would have streamlined the legislative pro-
cess and allowed a fast-track procedure for a range of legislative 
reforms.42 Some proposed reforms aimed at limiting labor rights 
and government spending, but others had a more redistributive 
focus and aimed at relieving the tax burden on middle-class fam-
ilies relative to corporations and high-income earners.43 
Similar changes could also be made to the design of federal 
or quasi-federal constitutional systems, such as the European 
Union. In most federal systems, there is significant redistribution 
of tax revenues across different parts of the federation. There is 
wide variation, however, in the degree to which redistribution of 
this kind seeks to achieve formal equality among constituent 
states versus addressing substantive concerns about spatial ine-
quality.44 One possible response to problems of rising economic in-
equality, therefore, would be to attempt to reorient federal tax 
and transfer policies toward a greater focus on inequality at the 
individual household level across different geographic areas.45 
 
 40 ESEC Overview (Economic, Social and Environmental Council, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9LSA-VJD5. 
 41 See generally, for example, Barbara Bibbo, Italy Votes for New Constitution amid 
Political Turmoil (Al Jazeera, Dec 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/A93D-JTDU; J.H., 
Why Is Italy’s Constitutional Referendum Important? (The Economist, Sept 28, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/59RW-EE9H. 
 42 See Graziella Romeo, The Italian Constitutional Reform of 2016: An ‘Exercise’ of 
Change at the Crossroad between Constitutional Maintenance and Innovation, Ita L J 31, 
32 (Special 2017). 
 43 See, for example, Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Renzi Due to Formally Submit Resig-
nation as Italy Ponders What Next (The Guardian, Dec 5, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7BZC-NC7A; Cèsar Colino, Maurizio Cotta, and Roman Maruhn, Italy Report 
*6–9 (Sustainable Governance Indicators, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/D2WT-VRMD. 
 44 See, for example, Ran Hirschl, Constitutional Law & Economic Inequality: Some 
Skeptical Thoughts (unpublished manuscript, 2017) (on file with author). 
 45 See id. 
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Finally, structural reforms might focus on popular constitu-
tional mechanisms or mechanisms of direct democracy, designed 
to force legislative attention to certain questions.46 In some US 
states, for instance, voters have used such mechanisms to adopt 
amendments that mandate a certain level of minimum expendi-
ture by state legislatures in certain key areas, such as education. 
Perhaps most notably, California adopted a ballot initiative in 
1988 requiring the state to spend a certain minimum percentage 
of its budget on K–12 education every year. The state has met 
its minimum funding requirement for each year since then.47 In 
Europe, Switzerland has adopted limitations on the construction 
and ownership of second homes through legislation limiting the 
percentage of nonprimary residences to 20 percent of the residen-
tial zones in every district.48 This legislation was also enacted in 
response to a popular initiative, inserting a constitutional limita-
tion on the ownership of second homes.49 And in Ecuador in 2017, 
voters approved a referendum to amend their constitution to ban 
public officials from holding assets in tax havens. Ecuador’s for-
eign minister also explicitly linked the aim of the relevant amend-
ment to attempts to address economic inequality, suggesting that 
its aim was to “increase transparency and increase tax revenue 
for development, while also cracking down on corruption and 
bringing down inequality.”50 
 
 46 See, for example, Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popu-
lar Initiatives, 40 Am J Polit Sci 99, 100 (1996); Daniel A. Smith and Caroline J. Tolbert, 
Educated by Initiative: The Effects of Direct Democracy on Citizens and Political Organi-
zations in the American States xi–xii (Michigan 2004). See also, for example, Colin Burgon, 
et al, Let’s Follow Ecuador in Holding a Referendum on Tax Havens (The Guardian, Feb 
17, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/A34E-PXGN. 
 47 See Mac Taylor, A Historical Review of Proposition 98 *5–7 (Legislative Analyst’s 
Office, Jan 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/595R-S365. Note, however, that the effect of 
the amendment was suspended for the fiscal year 2017–2018. See Troy Flint, Revised 
2017–18 Budget Suspends Proposition 98 (California School Boards Association, May 11, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/S8QT-A938; California School Boards Association, De-
tails on Prop 98 Suspension, Delay of One-Time Funds in May Revision (Public, May 15, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/9LNW-XB7K; Mac Taylor, The 2017–18 Budget: Analy-
sis of the May Revision Education Proposals *2 (Legislative Analyst’s Office, May 15, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/65YT-HVW5 (noting that despite the suspension there 
was in fact an increase in spending of 4.5 percent for year 2017–2018). 
 48 See John Heilprin, Parliament Works Out Kinks in Second Homes Law (Swiss Info, 
Mar 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XA9T-72HZ. 
 49 See id. See also Andrea Watson, At Home in the Alps (Gulf News, Nov 8, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/6NZZ-YFTG. 
 50 Alessio Perrone, Ecuador Votes to Bar Politicians from Having Assets in Tax Ha-
vens (New Internationalist, Feb 20, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4RX8-6MM3. 
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We do not suggest that all, or any, of these examples have 
been effective as responses to problems of inequality in wealth or 
income or have come without downsides.51 We simply note them 
as evidence of the legal and political plausibility of various forms 
of structural response. 
B. Constitutional Equality Guarantees 
Constitutional guarantees of equality, or equal protection, 
could also be expanded to more directly address inequality of in-
come and wealth. By definition, constitutional guarantees of 
equality, or nondiscrimination, are focused on notions of relative, 
rather than absolute, deprivation. They thus provide a logical 
way for courts or other constitutional actors to approach the dis-
parity between the poor, the middle class, and the wealthiest cit-
izens within a polity. 
Some formal guarantee of equality is a nearly universal fea-
ture of democratic constitutions worldwide, one that is certainly 
even more pervasive than guarantees of socioeconomic rights. 
Constitutional guarantees of equality, or nondiscrimination, have 
also expanded in recent decades to cover an increasingly long list 
of characteristics and dimensions of individual and group iden-
tity. Many of these characteristics also intersect with poverty or 
wealth and income.52 
International human-rights law has long recognized the in-
tersecting nature of commitments to social, political, and eco-
nomic equality. In guaranteeing a broad range of social rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights53 (ICESCR) explicitly prohibits discrimination by states on 
a range of grounds, including “social origin, property, [and] 
birth.”54 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
 
 51 See Taylor, A Historical Review of Proposition 98 at *21–28 (cited in note 47) (not-
ing possible limitations on California’s minimum educational budget provision). But see 
John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter Initiatives Para-
lyzed the California Budget?, 5 St Polit & Pol Q 248, 249–50 (2005) (concluding that “direct 
democracy [in California] cannot be blamed for causing [California’s] fiscal gridlock”). 
 52 See Beth Goldblatt, Intersectionality in International Anti-discrimination Law: 
Addressing Poverty in its Complexity, 21 Australian J Hum Rts 47, 47–48 (Oct 2015); 
Eduardo S. Bustelo, Expansion of Citizenship and Democratic Construction, in Willem van 
Genugten and Camilo Perez-Bustillo, eds, The Poverty of Rights: Human Rights and the 
Eradication of Poverty 3, 4–5 (Zed 2001). 
 53 993 UNTS 3 (Dec 16, 1966, entered into force Jan 3, 1976). 
 54 ICESCR Art 2(2), 993 UNTS at 5. 
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Rights has also interpreted the concept of “social origin” to encom-
pass a person’s economic and social status, the concept of “property” 
as extending to a range of personal property including income, and 
“birth” as including any inherited status, and thus potentially a 
person’s wealth.55 The International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention explicitly prohibits discrimination in employment 
based on social origin.56 
Both international and European human-rights bodies have 
also increasingly given express recognition to socioeconomic sta-
tus as a prohibited ground of discrimination. The Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), for 
instance, has recognized the intersection between sex, ethnic-
ity, and socioeconomic background as prohibited grounds of 
discrimination in respect of the rights protected by CEDAW.57 
The Council of Europe has recognized social origin as a prohib-
ited ground of discrimination in its revised European Social 
Charter.58 The European Union has recognized social origin and 
property as prohibited grounds of discrimination under Article 21 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.59 
And the European Court of Human Rights, in certain contexts, 
has recognized socioeconomic status as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.60 
Some recent constitutions also adopt similar constitutional un-
derstandings of equality; for example, South Africa and Kenya in-
clude “social origin” and “birth” as grounds of discrimination ex-
pressly prohibited by their constitutions.61 The 2008 Ecuadorian 
 
 55 General Comment No. 20: Non-discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, UN Economic and Social Council, 42d sess (July 2, 2009), UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 
7–8. For discussion of General Comment No 20, see Tamas Kadar, An Analysis of the In-
troduction of Socio-economic Status as a Discrimination Ground *8 (Equality and Rights 
Alliance, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZC9D-B78B. 
 56 C111—Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention Art 1(1)(a) 
(June 25, 1958, entered into force June 15, 1960).  
 57 Communication No. 17/2008, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women, 49th sess (July 25, 2011), UN Doc CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008 
20–21 (acting under Optional Protocol Art 7, ¶ 3). 
 58 European Social Charter Art E, 2151 UNTS 277, 294 (Oct 18, 1961, entered into 
force Feb 26, 1965, revised May 5, 1996). 
 59 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Art 21(1), 55 J EU C326 
391, 400 (2012). 
 60 See Garib v The Netherlands, App No 43494/09, 30 at ¶ 2, 34 at ¶ 18, 35–36 at 
¶ 24 (ECtHR 2016) (López Guerra and Keller dissenting) (criticizing a government meas-
ure for limiting a person’s right to her residence on the basis of being “socioeconomically 
underprivileged”); Soares de Melo v Portugal, App No 72850/14 (ECtHR 2016) (protecting 
the parental rights of those in poverty). 
 61 S Afr Const Ch 2, Art 9(3); Kenya Const Ch 4, Art 27(4). 
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constitution prohibits discrimination based on “socio-economic 
condition,”62 and the 2009 Bolivian constitution on “economic or 
social condition.”63 The Jamaican constitution lists “social class” 
as a ground of discrimination prohibited by the 2011 Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms;64 and the 2013 Zimbabwean 
constitution prohibits discrimination based on “economic or social 
status.”65 In Europe, Cyprus also now lists “social descent,” 
“wealth,” and “social class” as prohibited grounds of discrimina-
tion in a constitutional context.66 
Courts in various countries have also relied on guarantees of 
equality, either generally or specific to economic equality, so as to 
prompt legislatures to adopt policies that are cognizant of the 
needs of the poor—and in some cases also the middle class, in the 
face of issues of relative deprivation. The German Constitutional 
Court, for instance, has for decades scrutinized the legislature’s 
higher-education policies to ensure that admissions requirements 
do not unnecessarily or disproportionately exclude those from 
nonwealthy backgrounds. 
In a series of cases on higher education since the 1970s, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court declared that some forms 
of social inequality are incompatible with the constitutional or-
der. Legislative reforms and demographic changes in the 1960s 
and 1970s significantly increased the number of students, partic-
ularly from modest social backgrounds, who obtained higher edu-
cation in public universities.67 In response, some universities 
placed limits on the number of students admitted to certain elite 
fields of study, such as law and medicine.68 In two decisions in the 
1970s, known as Numerus Clausus I69 and Numerus Clausus II,70 
the West German Federal Constitutional Court invalidated these 
limits, invoking three constitutional sources: the right to freely 
choose an occupation, which it read to include educational oppor-
tunities (Article 12(1)); equality before the law (Article 3(1)); and 
 
 62 Ecuador Const Ch 1, Art 11(2). 
 63 Bolivia Const Title II, Ch 1, Art 14(II). 
 64 Jamaica Const Ch III, Art 13(3)(i)(ii). 
 65 Zimbabwe Const Ch 4, Pt 2, Art 56(3) (emphasis added). 
 66 Cyprus Const Pt II, Art 28(2). 
 67 See Donald P. Kommers and Russell A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 678–79 (Duke 3d ed 2012). In Germany at this time, 
many students from low-income backgrounds attended secondary schools oriented toward 
vocational training rather than higher education. Id at 679. 
 68 Id at 678–79. 
 69 33 BVerfGE 303 (W Ger Fed Const Ct 1972). 
 70 43 BVerfGE 34 (W Ger Fed Const Ct 1977). 
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the social-state principle.71 In Numerus Clausus I, the court ex-
plicitly declared, “In a social and constitutional state one cannot 
leave it to the limited discretion of governmental agencies to de-
termine the circle of beneficiaries and to exclude some citizens 
from these privileges, especially since this would result in the gov-
ernment steering the choice of a profession.”72 The court’s decision 
led to a series of reforms, both at the university level and by fed-
eral legislative action, to reform admissions procedures to accom-
modate more students.73 
The German higher-education cases highlight the extent and 
limits of constitutional equality as a normative source for leveling 
up the lower and middle classes. As these cases illustrate, it is not 
equality alone, but equality taken together with substantive so-
cial rights to freely choose an occupation, that the court has read 
to include the broader social right to higher education. As is well 
known, in the United States, efforts by civil rights advocates in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s to equalize education funding by 
way of the federal Equal Protection Clause failed. In San Antonio 
Independent School District v Rodriguez,74 the US Supreme Court 
held that policies disadvantaging children residing in neigh-
borhoods with low property values did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.75 In Rodriguez, the Court found that education 
was not a fundamental right under the federal constitution.76 The 
Court declined to obligate state legislatures to address unequal 
education when it resulted from purported distinctions of wealth. 
C. Social and Economic Rights 
While the US Constitution famously does not include any ex-
press guarantee of social rights, an overwhelming majority of con-
stitutions worldwide adopt a long list of social rights guarantees: 
they protect rights to education, work, health, housing, food, wa-
ter, and social security.77 They also frequently adopt a range of 
 
 71 See generally Numerus Clausus I, 33 BVerfGE 303, reprinted in Kommers and 
Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany at 680–81 
(cited in note 67). 
 72 Kommers and Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany at 681 (cited in note 67). 
 73 Id at 684. 
 74 411 US 1 (1973). 
 75 Id at 54–55. 
 76 Id at 37. 
 77 Mila Versteeg and Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revis-
ited, 81 U Chi L Rev 1641, 1681–82 (2014). 
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labor-rights provisions, including rights to organize, to strike, and 
even to fair terms and conditions. In the United States itself, state 
constitutions also frequently protect some subset of these rights, 
particularly rights to education.78 
Courts around the world have also interpreted these provi-
sions to be judicially enforceable in a range of contexts.79 In some 
cases, this has simply involved enforcing relevant rights as a form 
of “shield”—supplying an additional reason to uphold government 
action that, while impinging other rights (such as the right to 
property or contract), actively furthers or upholds the principles 
underlying a social right.80 In others, it has meant giving effect to 
such rights as protection for individuals against the threat of gov-
ernment interference—such as through actions removing people 
from land or informal housing, or excluding people from social se-
curity or welfare entitlements.81 But, in some cases, it has also 
involved courts giving effect to these rights in a more affirmative 
way, as a basis for requiring additional government action aimed 
at implementing relevant rights. 
In South Africa, for instance, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa (CCSA) has interpreted the government’s constitu-
tional duty, under §§ 26(2) and 27(2), to provide access to housing 
 
 78 Id at 1683–85. 
 79 For discussion, see Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review 
and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law 142–57 (Princeton 2008). 
 80 See, for example, Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Asso-
ciation, [2001] 3 S Afr 1151, ¶¶ 107–08 (CC) (citing the constitutional right to housing in 
upholding the government’s decision to use a government-owned prison farm to house 
flood victims, even when it adversely affected neighboring residents’ property values). 
 81 See, for example, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd, [2011] 2 S Afr 104, 133–34 at ¶ 97 (CC) (striking the City of 
Johannesburg’s housing policy for excluding evicted people from its temporary housing 
program); South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, [2005] 5 S Afr 3, 22–23 at ¶¶ 45–
49, 28 at ¶ 68 (CC) (ordering that tens of thousands of occupiers may continue to occupy 
private property until the government provides alternative accommodation); Occupiers of 
Skurweplaas v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd, [2011] 4 BCLR 382, ¶ 3 (S Afr CC) (or-
dering that the City of Tshwane must provide occupiers with alternative accommodation); 
Occupiers of Portion R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355 JR v Golden Thread Ltd, [2011] 2 S 
Afr 337, 345 at ¶ 21 (CC) (ordering the City of Tshwane to take certain steps when evicting 
occupiers, including documenting effects on occupiers and providing alternative accommo-
dation). See also generally Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corp, [1985] 3 SCC 545 (India 
1985) (holding that the right to livelihood is included in the right to life and delaying the 
eviction of persons living in the slums of Bombay); Jo Griffin, Brazilian Supreme Court 
Upholds Rights of Indigenous People (The Guardian, Aug 17, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5CVZ-RY94 (reporting on recent Brazilian Supreme Court cases upholding 
indigenous land rights). 
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and health care as requiring the government to show that its ac-
tions implementing this obligation are objectively reasonable.82 
The CCSA also found that, by failing to take active steps to pro-
vide for the needs of the homeless and pregnant mothers with 
HIV outside certain pilot sites, the government had acted unrea-
sonably and, thus, contrary to its obligations under §§ 26(2) and 
27(2).83 The CCSA has also interpreted socioeconomic-rights guar-
antees as intersecting with broader commitments to substantive 
equality, so that in Khosa v Minister of Social Development,84 the 
CCSA found the exclusion of permanent residents from certain pa-
rental and other social grants was unreasonable in terms of both 
§ 27(2) and the guarantee of equality in § 9 of the constitution.85 
In the United States, for almost five decades since Rodriguez, 
several state supreme courts have been invalidating some property-
tax-based funding formulas for public education based on state 
constitutions.86 While state constitutional guarantees of equality 
are frequently invoked in this litigation, the focus has been on 
substantive guarantees in state constitutions of education rights, 
or, more precisely, constitutional clauses declaring the state’s re-
sponsibility for providing education. These education guarantees 
have led courts to recognize every child’s entitlement to a mini-
mally adequate education. Yet, ensuring that the least advan-
taged members of society can access a minimally adequate edu-
cation does not necessarily reduce relative advantages of the 
wealthy. As noted earlier, the new populist politics grows not only 
out of the deprivations sustained by the undereducated and un-
deremployed, but also the resentment of governing elites whose 
relative advantage is growing. The enforcement of social rights 
thus speaks only partially to the threats arising from economic 
inequality. There is a need to focus beyond the least advantaged, 
toward investing in a stable working middle class. 
 
 82 See South Africa v Grootboom, [2000] 1 S Afr 46, 67–69 at ¶¶ 38–44 (CC), quoting 
S Afr Const § 26(2); Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign, [2002] 5 S Afr 721, 
738 at ¶ 30 (CC), quoting S Afr Const § 27(2). 
 83 See Grootboom, [2000] 1 S Afr at 87 at ¶ 99; Treatment Action Campaign, [2002] 
5 S Afr at 764–66 at ¶ 135. 
 84 [2004] 6 S Afr 505 (CC). 
 85 Id at 529–40 at ¶¶ 48–85, citing S Afr Const §§ 9, 27(2). 
 86 See, for example, Serrano v Priest, 487 P2d 1241, 1244 (Cal 1971); Abbott v 
Burke, 575 A2d 359, 363 (NJ 1990); Horton v Meskill, 376 A2d 359, 374–75 (Conn 1977); 
Edgewood Independent School District v Kirby, 777 SW2d 391, 397 (Tex 1989); Gannon v 
Kansas, 319 P3d 1196, 1251 (Kan 2014). But see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State, 655 
NE2d 661, 665–66 (NY 1995) (holding that, although school funding inequalities are not 
unconstitutional, students are entitled to “the opportunity of a sound basic education”). 
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Take a decision like South Africa v Grootboom,87 which found 
that it was unreasonable for the South African government to fail 
to provide any form of emergency relief to those homeless as a 
result of eviction or other circumstances.88 A decision of this kind 
had a very clear capacity to address the needs of the poor, but at 
the potential expense of low-income workers: if the government 
chose to fund increased access to emergency housing out of the 
existing housing budget, this would necessarily mean fewer dol-
lars available for the construction of affordable housing. To ad-
dress ordinary wage earners’ needs, therefore, a decision like 
Grootboom could not simply focus on the needs of the poorest, 
most vulnerable citizens.89 It would also need to include a notion 
of what was minimally adequate to address the needs of ordinary 
wage earners unable to access affordable housing via the market. 
This would also have required a distinctly broader, more maxi-
malist approach to defining the scope of relevant rights than the 
court actually adopted in Grootboom—for example, stipulating 
that increased access to emergency housing could not come at the 
expense of an increased backlog in access to affordable formal 
housing. 
An example of this kind of pro-middle-class housing-rights 
jurisprudence can also be found in a range of existing contexts. In 
Colombia, for instance, the constitutional court has delivered sev-
eral important opinions protecting the middle class from punitive 
mortgage interest rate increases and from barriers to access to 
certain forms of healthcare.90 These decisions have simply turned 
on a generous understanding of the “social state” principle. Simi-
larly, in Hungary, the constitutional court has delivered a range 
of decisions protecting the middle class from a sudden drop in so-
cial welfare benefits by relying on a generous approach to the 
principle of legal certainty.91 
III.  OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES 
In this final Part, we assess the failures of these constitu-
tional responses to disrupt the economic inequalities that are 
 
 87 [2000] 1 S Afr 46 (CC). 
 88 See id at 87 at ¶ 99. 
 89 See id at 53 at ¶¶ 2–3. 
 90 See David Landau and Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Non-transformation? Soci-
oeconomic Rights beyond the Poor *10, 13 (working paper, 2017) (on file with authors). 
 91 See Laszlo Solyom, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Social Change, 19 
Yale J Intl L 223, 233 (1994). 
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threatening the survival of liberal constitutional democracies. 
First, the enforcement of equality and nondiscrimination rights 
raises difficulties regarding the definition of the classes or cate-
gories worthy of constitutional protection. Second, the enforce-
ment of social and economic rights tends to focus on alleviating 
poverty or helping the poor, and therefore insufficiently addresses 
the destabilizing dynamics resulting from wealth that is per-
ceived to be excessive. Third, the structural and procedural inter-
ventions, intended to loosen specific barriers to social or economic 
reform at one particular historical moment, may work at a differ-
ent historical moment to facilitate altogether different reform 
agendas by leaders with authoritarian or antidemocratic tenden-
cies. Finally, all three of these limits point to the fact that signif-
icant reductions in economic inequality require the disruption of 
incumbent power and wealth. Institutional path dependence is 
difficult to overcome, and the fear of incumbents’ resistance and 
backlash may deter the efforts of those desirous of change. Over-
laid with these distinct obstacles are also arguably two interre-
lated challenges: (1) the challenge posed by “neoliberal” ideology 
and (2) its commitment to an unmodified form of market-based 
legal ordering and forces of legal and economic globalization, 
which often amplify this ideological approach. We do not believe 
that globalization is inevitably in tension with commitments to 
economic equality; indeed, there have been notable proposals in 
recent years to respond to inequality in truly global ways, which 
necessarily depend on the infrastructure and interconnections 
created by globalization.92 But it does pose potential obstacles to 
change in ways that suggest that constitutional responses to 
 
 92 For a discussion on proposals to implement a global universal basic income, see, 
for example, Abhijit Banerjee, et al, Basic Income Could Transform Society. But First, It 
Needs to Be Tested (Poverty Action Lab, May 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
9VFD-CCZD; Annie Lowrey, The Future of Not Working (NY Times Mag, Feb 23, 2017), 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/magazine/universal-income-global 
-inequality.html?mcubz=0 (visited Oct 18, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing 
the beta test of basic income in Kenya); Michael Faye and Paul Niehaus, What If We Just 
Gave Poor People a Basic Income for Life? That’s What We’re about to Test (Slate, Apr 14, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3UUA-QJKC (discussing the testing of basic incomes in 
Finland and Canada). See also David Noonan, Is Guaranteed Income for All the Answer to 
Joblessness and Poverty? (Scientific American, July 18, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2L5P-Y2PC. 
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inequality cannot be divorced from broader legal-economic re-
sponses—including in the design of international trade and in-
vestment agreements.93 
A. Challenges of Definition 
The difficulty of defining the grounds and manifestations of 
discrimination is familiar from the rich bodies of antidiscrimina-
tion doctrine around sex and race inequality. Similarly, even if we 
agree that a constitutional guarantee of equality should prohibit 
socioeconomic discrimination, we can expect a wide range of views 
as to what that would mean. Would it include only policies that 
explicitly denigrated persons on the basis of their wealth or in-
come? Or would it also include policies that had a disparate im-
pact on those who had less money than others? Would we meas-
ure socioeconomic status by the amount of income, or also by 
wealth? Wealth held by the individual or also by the immediate 
family? What about education levels and the future potential for 
earnings growth in a particular job? And so forth. In Rodriguez, 
the US Supreme Court rejected the proposal to make wealth a sus-
pect classification to trigger strict scrutiny for Equal Protection 
Clause purposes.94 There, the litigants argued that the policy of 
basing school funding on local property taxes violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it discriminated against the poor.95 The 
Court raised doubts about whether the lower levels of funding for 
schools in neighborhoods with low property values necessarily 
caused disadvantage to the poor, noting that residing in a geo-
graphic zone with low property values does not necessarily make 
the resident poor.96 The Rodriguez Court’s grappling with the def-
inition of wealth discrimination is a vivid illustration of the po-
tential for disagreement about which forms and dynamics of soci-
oeconomic inequality should be constitutionally targeted. 
Indeed, liberal political theorists who describe themselves 
as egalitarian have long disagreed about what to equalize and 
how to do it. In A Theory of Justice, political theorist John Rawls 
proposed the “difference principle,” which holds that distributive 
 
 93 See, for example, David Schneiderman, Constitution or Model Treaty? Struggling 
over the Interpretive Authority of NAFTA, in Sujit Choudhry, ed, The Migration of Consti-
tutional Ideas 294, 295–96 (Cambridge 2006) (criticizing NAFTA as subverting constitu-
tional self-government, especially forms that are progressive in character). 
 94 Rodriguez, 411 US at 28–29. 
 95 See id at 22–25. 
 96 See id at 22–23. 
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inequalities can be justified only if they make the least advan-
taged members of society better off than they would be under a 
strictly equal distribution.97 Philosopher Ronald Dworkin has ar-
gued for equalizing resources,98 rather than welfare, and others 
have proposed a norm of equal opportunity for welfare.99 Econo-
mist Amartya Sen and Professor Martha Nussbaum have devel-
oped the notion that human capabilities must be optimized 
through equalization efforts.100 The “currency” of egalitarian jus-
tice can include money, other resources, welfare, or other metrics. 
This potential for disagreement is exemplified also by the range 
of approaches found in statutory regimes that attempt to prohibit 
some form of economic discrimination. International human-rights 
law recognizes birth (for example, wealth), property (income), and 
social origin (or social class or economic status) as potentially pro-
hibited grounds of discrimination. Latin American, African, and 
Caribbean countries take a variety of approaches to defining rel-
evant forms of constitutional equality protection. And national 
statutes that prohibit discrimination based on economic status 
adopt a variety of definitional approaches: a survey of the laws of 
thirty-five European countries in this context found that ten 
countries use the concept of “social origin”; thirteen prohibit dis-
crimination based on social “status,” “position,” “condition,” or 
“class,” and sixteen on either “wealth, income, property, economic 
situation or financial status.”101 
B. Leveling Up or Leveling Down? 
Even when constitutional courts enforce equality rights—for 
example, the right to equal educational opportunity—there is a 
strong emphasis on leveling up the poor or most disadvantaged 
members of society to a minimum standard. Once all relevant per-
sons can access that minimum level, it appears coherent to say 
 
 97 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 75–80 (Belknap 1971). See also Murray 
Wesson, The Limits of Constitutional Justice (unpublished manuscript, 2017) (on file 
with authors). 
 98 See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 Phil & Pub 
Affairs 185, 188 (1981). See also Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of 
Resources, 10 Phil & Pub Affairs 283, 284–88 (1981). 
 99 See, for example, Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 
56 Philosophical Stud 77, 77–78 (1989). 
 100 See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 87–90 (Knopf 1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 17–20 (Belknap 2011). 
 101 See Kadar, Socio-economic Status as a Discrimination Ground at *11 (cited in 
note 55). 
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that equal opportunity has been achieved. There are disagree-
ments about what that minimum level is, especially in the context 
of education. Should it be measured by the amount of money 
spent per pupil, academic achievement on standardized tests, or 
a qualitative evaluation of the curriculum and teachers? Even if 
we were to overcome these disagreements about how the mini-
mum should be defined, another very significant problem is that 
leveling up the poor to a minimum standard inadequately ad-
dresses the destabilizing dynamics of growing economic inequal-
ity. As noted earlier, the problem consists not only of growing pov-
erty rates and economic insecurity associated with poverty, but 
also the decline of the middle class. The problem is not only that 
the working class is poor, but that there is a growing gap between 
the working class and the wealthy elite, with diminishing pro-
spects for upward social mobility. In many countries, one of the 
drivers of rising economic inequality is the massive increase in 
the share of income and wealth enjoyed by the top 1 percent of 
income earners. The thorny question then arises as to whether a 
commitment to reducing economic inequality should focus on lev-
eling down as well as leveling up. 
We noted earlier that the authoritarian tendencies growing 
out of populist politics is partially a consequence of economic 
inequality. Economic inequality is fueling an illiberal populist- 
nationalist politics of resentment against liberal elites. The re-
sentment grows not only out of dissatisfaction with a life of dep-
rivation, but also out of a sense that those with wealth and privi-
lege control the public institutions without being adversely 
affected by their failure.102 It may be necessary to reduce the 
wealth and privilege of the wealthiest, perhaps to make them 
more invested in the fate of the democratic nation that their 
money and social background enable them to control, to ade-
quately address the real threat of economic inequality to liberal 
constitutional democracy. When a healthy majority of people are 
well educated, stably employed, and dependent on the public in-
stitutions of a democracy, in which they have a meaningful voice, 
we reach the point at which we would cease to worry about the 
threat of economic inequality to liberal-democratic constitution-
alism. A growing literature is exploring and defending a stable 
middle class as a necessary feature of sustainably stable liberal 
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constitutional democracies.103 In addition to leveling up the poor, 
some degree of leveling down the wealthy governing elites is 
probably necessary to restore faith in the public institutions of 
democracy. 
Consider, for example, recent efforts to equalize school fund-
ing in Kansas through state constitutional litigation. In a line of 
decisions starting in 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court has inval-
idated various funding formulas adopted by the state legislature, 
both on grounds of equality and on grounds of adequate educa-
tion.104 The dynamic at issue in these cases is that, when the state 
cuts funding across the board, districts inhabited by low-income 
families are more adversely impacted because school districts 
with wealthier inhabitants can (and did) raise local tax revenues 
to make up for the decreases. In such situations, the Kansas 
Supreme Court took the view that, under the two relevant consti-
tutional provisions, “[s]chool districts must have reasonably equal 
access to substantially similar educational opportunity through 
similar tax effort.”105 One of the problems that the Kansas courts 
grappled with was the inequity that resulted from wealthy dis-
tricts’ freedom to spend more money on their own children. 
Similarly, in California, policy debates are ongoing with re-
gard to the extent to which public school parent associations 
should be permitted to engage in fundraising for their own 
schools.106 In wealthy areas, fundraising by parents raises suffi-
cient funds to pay for assistant teachers and arts programs, par-
ticularly when state budget cuts propose cutting these expendi-
tures. Some districts have imposed the requirement that all funds 
raised by parent fundraising be shared by the district, so as to 
benefit schools within the district that are largely attended by 
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low-income families.107 Such rules have led to resistance and op-
position by wealthy parents, who understandably want their 
fundraising efforts to directly benefit their own children’s 
schools.108 Even in the absence of overt resistance, such rules have 
had the effect of decreasing the funds donated by parents and 
available to be shared district-wide. Leveling down is not only re-
sisted, but in some situations, it appears counterproductive be-
cause it can lead to lower levels of investment in public institu-
tions than would be made if the wealthy were subject to fewer 
leveling-down demands, which in turn can worsen the quality of 
those institutions for the least advantaged.109 
C. Unintended Consequences and Counterproductive 
Consequences 
This brings us to a related barrier, which is that efforts to 
amend or reinterpret constitutions to address economic inequal-
ity may be counterproductive to remedying inequality. Popular-
initiative procedures, for instance, have in fact often been used to 
create constitutional changes that impose active barriers to 
meaningful economic redistribution—by depriving states of the 
funds necessary actually to achieve relevant reforms. This, for ex-
ample, has arguably been one consequence of a range of balanced 
budget amendments adopted by way of popular initiative in vari-
ous US states. 
In addition, by expanding social-rights or equality guaran-
tees and imposing strong, horizontal effects without altering the 
current market-based distribution of wealth, income, and employ-
ment, the enforcement of equality may also have distinctly coun-
terproductive effects. US courts’ efforts to achieve racial integra-
tion of schools on constitutional equality grounds have not been 
consistently successful, and some commentators have suggested 
that they have been counterproductive.110 After a series of school 
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desegregation cases that established courts’ strong powers to or-
der remedies like busing to integrate schools, whites reacted, first 
with violent resistance,111 and then by flight to the suburbs.112 The 
Supreme Court reacted to this resistance through a line of cases, 
including Rodriguez, in which it retreated from its earlier strong 
normative view that the Constitution required racial integration. 
Distinguishing between integration and desegregation, the Court 
began to say that constitutional equal protection required only 
desegregation, and not full integration.113 Building on this notion, 
the Court declined to hold that the Constitution required any in-
tegration across the boundaries between school districts estab-
lished in suburbs and cities,114 in which whites and blacks lived 
as separately as they had during the era of legally mandated 
segregation. 
One might argue that the strong efforts by courts to integrate 
schools were counterproductive because they led to forms of re-
sistance that further cemented segregation on the ground, which 
courts then blessed as consistent with constitutional equality. To-
day, public schools are still not racially or socioeconomically inte-
grated in the United States, and one may wonder whether we 
would have achieved greater integration over the last sixty years 
if the federal courts had exercised weaker forms of judicial review 
initially. 
Another example of a counterproductive consequence is 
found in one of the most common forms of discrimination com-
plaint in countries that do prohibit discrimination based on eco-
nomic status: complaints by tenants that a landlord has discrim-
inated against them based on socioeconomic status.115 
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Discrimination in this context could take two forms: it could in-
volve direct discrimination against low-income groups based on 
stereotypical assumptions about the likelihood that individuals 
from that group will prove desirable and responsible tenants, or 
indirect discrimination based on a preference for tenants with 
higher earnings (and thus statistical likelihood of being able to 
meet minimum rental obligations). If a constitution prohibits 
indirect discrimination of this kind in a market economy, this may 
also lead to distinctly counterproductive results. 
If landlords are required by law to lease to a lower-income 
tenant, when an otherwise identical high-income tenant is avail-
able, in most market contexts this will lead landlords to pass on 
the increased costs (or decrease in expected rental returns) via an 
increase in average rents.116 As law-and-economics scholars have 
long argued, an increase of this kind will also disproportionately 
harm those that equality law is seeking to help: it will mean that 
low-income tenants, or those who can least afford an increase, will 
face higher rental prices in ways that often effectively price them 
out of the market.117 State actors, in contrast, have the option of 
not passing on the costs of a nondiscrimination mandate to low-
income consumers or workers by drawing on consolidated revenue 
to meet its constitutional obligations (including in a way that in-
volves giving targeted subsidies or other forms of relief to low-
income tenants). 
If constitutional norms have horizontal application in a 
market-based context, this may also mean that court decisions 
that attempt to redistribute economic resources are actually af-
firmatively counterproductive. Instead of helping redistribute re-
sources from the wealthy to the poor or middle class, they may 
end up simply increasing the cost of access to basic services for 
low-income individuals and households, who can least afford to 
bear such a cost increase. 
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D. Institutional Path Dependence 
Recent work by comparative constitutional scholars notes 
that some constitutional design choices are “sticky” and resistant 
to change.118 On one level, voters’ behavioral biases, including en-
dowment effects, may make them reluctant to support constitu-
tional change. But beyond irrational voter preferences, existing 
constitutional structures effectively give formal veto powers to 
certain democratic actors, enabling the systematic frustration of 
efforts to reform these structures by formal constitutional amend-
ment. The structure of the US Senate is a good example. Article V 
of the US Constitution makes the equal representation of each 
state in the Senate effectively unamendable.119 Thus, an excess of 
legislative power is disproportionately allocated to smaller states 
because Article V would require any state whose representation 
would become unequal to consent to the amendment. Giving 
smaller states such veto power over the structure of the Senate 
entrenches their disproportionate power over federal lawmaking. 
Even in the absence of formal veto powers allocated by con-
stitutional text, informal features of various constitutional re-
gimes may also prevent any meaningful constitutionalization of 
economic equality. Legislative efforts at the state and federal 
level to reform campaign finance, to regulate elections, and to re-
duce the power of wealthy voters are often stymied by the incum-
bent power of the wealthy to influence legislative and electoral 
processes. Corporations and wealthy elites spend vast amounts to 
defeat legislative and regulatory proposals that might otherwise 
limit their future influence over electoral politics or their right to 
spend even more money in the political domain in the future. In 
the United States, for instance, Congress has thus far failed to 
approve even quite modest attempts to limit the effective disclo-
sure and reporting requirements.120 Various super PACs have also 
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run public campaigns against these proposals and their congres-
sional sponsors.121 
Finally, the institutional path dependence of courts enforcing 
constitutional rights can itself be a barrier to meaningful consti-
tutional change in favor of economic inequality. First, courts may 
simply lack the capacity to decide cases in ways that bring about 
inclusive growth and effective redistribution. Courts’ efforts to 
use their traditional strong remedial powers—injunctions order-
ing redistribution, integration, or other significant institutional 
change, and high damage awards—have historically been met 
with resistance and avoidance by those affected by the remedies 
flowing from constitutional equality pronouncements.122 Further-
more, reducing economic inequalities in ways that mitigate the 
threats they engender requires levels of expertise and policy judg-
ment that the judiciary may not have. Reducing economic ine-
quality involves the regulation of zoning, transportation, infra-
structure, environmental impacts, access to credit markets, and 
evaluating social services like education at an astonishingly mi-
cro level—including teacher retention policies and pedagogical 
philosophies in curricula.123 These are clearly questions well be-
yond the expertise of most constitutional judges. Compared to leg-
islatures and the executive branch, courts are generally not struc-
tured to make broad use of adequate policy experts on these types 
of questions. Thus, courts’ efforts to intervene strongly in these pol-
icy problems risk perceptions of incompetence and illegitimacy. 
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Of course, the structure and procedures of constitutional 
courts are not fixed. One can imagine strengthening formal op-
portunities for policy experts to weigh in beyond the existing 
framework of amicus briefs. In addition, the objection to courts’ 
role in reducing economic inequality is most persuasive when as-
suming courts engage in strong forms of judicial review, combin-
ing unequal norm pronouncements and aggressive remedies. 
However, a growing literature documents the work of many con-
stitutional courts that engage in weaker forms of review, which 
seek to nudge legislators and other actors to take progressive 
steps toward the realization of constitutional rights. 
In some constitutional systems, the constitution expressly 
empowers courts to engage in weak forms of review of this kind. 
It may thus seem relatively unproblematic, in such systems, for 
courts to play an important role in influencing questions of social 
and economic policy. In other systems, by contrast, judges and 
lawyers might assume, consistent with the prevailing under-
standing, that judicial review, if exercised, must be strong.124 
This, however, is itself a contingent and path-dependent under-
standing of the appropriate scope and function of the judicial role; 
courts can always fashion and adopt doctrines that effectively cre-
ate forms of de facto weak review. Courts can make narrow fact-
specific statements of rights, deferred or noncoercive judicial rem-
edies, or weak notions of stare decisis.125 
Therefore, there is nothing stopping courts from engaging in 
weak forms of enforcement of constitutional equality commit-
ments. Yet whether they do so on the ground may depend on the 
extent to which the political branches entrust them to do so, 
which itself depends on the degree to which they have previously 
shown a willingness to adopt weak approaches to judicial enforce-
ment. Legislatures might be more willing to create judicially en-
forceable rights to social and economic equality if they trust 
judges to respect legislative priorities by, for instance, giving leg-
islatures opportunities to remedy rights violations found by the 
judiciary before judicial remedies are imposed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The growing concentrations of wealth and middle-class com-
pression threaten liberal-democratic constitutional systems. The 
forms of economic inequality that are becoming commonplace in 
advanced liberal democracies erode the people’s trust in govern-
ment and erode the legitimacy of shared public institutions. To 
date, democratic constitutions have offered limited responses to 
this threat. 
In this Essay, we outlined ways in which a constitutional re-
sponse to economic inequality could potentially be enhanced or 
expanded in the future: there is a range of structural changes de-
signed to make it easier and more likely that legislatures will 
adopt pro–inclusive growth policies, or policies designed to pro-
mote economic redistribution and rights-based responses that 
rely on courts to prod legislators into adopting more inclusive or 
redistributive government policies. These responses can take a 
variety of forms based on the particular national context. Struc-
tural reforms may involve changes to current models of demo-
cratic representation so as to give greater voice to the interests of 
the poor or middle class, either directly or indirectly; changes to 
campaign finance that seek to shift the balance between poor, 
wealthy, and middle-class voters in liberal constitutional sys-
tems; and structural reforms that make it easier for legislatures 
to adopt pro–inclusive growth policies, or policies designed to pro-
mote economic redistribution. Rights-based responses could en-
sue if voters require legislatures to address particular topics—or 
adopt certain kinds of legislation—by the initiative process, and 
such responses may also involve the expansion of socioeconomic-
rights guarantees. 
Yet we also noted a range of important obstacles to constitu-
tional change of this kind: issues of conceptual definition and 
scope, unintended consequences, and institutional path depend-
ence. Defining who exactly should be protected by an expanded 
constitutional focus on inequality is difficult conceptually and po-
litically. Particularly in liberal societies committed to background 
norms of market-based ordering, many definitions will also be 
substantially overinclusive. Procedures that seek to empower leg-
islatures to address certain issues can themselves also be overin-
clusive in that they allow legislatures to address a range of other 
topics, including legislation with distinctly antidemocratic aims. 
Attempts to expand constitutional law to more directly address 
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economic equality may also be counterproductive in certain cir-
cumstances; they may lead voters to use their newfound powers 
to hamstring rather than empower legislatures to adopt econom-
ically redistributive measures, or they may lead courts to adopt 
rigid or formalistic understandings of equality that then lead to 
the invalidation rather than promotion of measures that promote 
greater economic redistribution and inclusion. Or, if constitu-
tional guarantees of equality are understood to apply horizon-
tally, in an unmodified way, this may end up imposing costs on 
private providers of key goods and services—such as housing, 
health care, education—in ways that are then directly passed on 
to consumers, including most notably low-income and middle-
income consumers. 
What does this mean for the future of liberal constitutional-
ism? Clearly there are the intellectual resources within the liberal 
constitutional tradition for responding to the threat posed to it, 
from within, by rising economic inequality. Yet, liberal constitu-
tions also contain a range of structural features—and intellectual 
commitments—that make adopting these responses quite diffi-
cult or unlikely. 
Optimists might suggest that necessity is the mother of in-
vention and that new economic and political challenges will help 
overcome long-standing obstacles to change in this area. Recent 
democratic constitutions certainly show a greater willingness to 
tackle these questions than older liberal constitutions. New con-
stitutions in the Global South, for instance, have gone further in 
adopting new legislative committees with special responsibility 
for poverty and express prohibitions on discrimination based on 
economic grounds than older constitutions in the Global North.126 
European countries and courts have also gone significantly further 
than other liberal democracies in the Global North in developing 
constitutional responses to problems of economic inequality.127 
Those with a more pessimistic bent, however, may view these 
developments as limited in both scope and success such that there 
is no real ground to believe that changes of this kind will be 
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adopted more broadly among liberal constitutions—at least in the 
Global North, where the threat to liberal-constitution knowledge 
is, it seems, at a new peak. 
We do not purport to provide an answer to this debate or to 
offer our own view on the likely trajectory of liberal constitution-
alism. Both views seem plausible, based on the available current 
evidence. Determining which prevails must necessarily be the 
topic of another symposium like this in the coming decades. 
